On 16 November 2026, the preventive measures section of the Milan court placed the Italian branch of Revolut Bank UAB under judicial administration for one year, finding that inadequate anti-money-laundering safeguards had allowed 24 people — either under investigation or convicted for offences including money laundering and tax fraud with possible mafia links — to move or hide €41.9 million between 2021 and 2026. It is a rare and striking use of a legal tool normally seen in Italian fashion or logistics cases, now applied to a major EU-passported digital bank. Understanding the Revolut Italy judicial administration in full requires looking at these details closely.

This article walks through what the court decided, what it means in context, and where the limits of public reporting lie. The focus here is the Revolut Italy judicial administration order itself, as reported by Euronews and corroborated by other outlets; the surrounding directory context comes from gf6.com’s own four-year curated database of bank and ATM locations worldwide.

A courthouse facade in Milan representing judicial oversight of a digital bank – Revolut Italy judicial administration

The finding — what the Milan court actually decided — Revolut Italy judicial administration

The ruling came from the preventive measures section of the Milan court, acting on a request from public prosecutor Paolo Storari and following a Guardia di Finanza investigation. The key figures and parties, exactly as reported, are summarised below. These figures put the Revolut Italy judicial administration into clearer perspective.

Element Detail
Date of order 16 November 2026
Court Milan court, preventive measures section
Prosecutor Paolo Storari
Investigating body Guardia di Finanza
Entity placed under administration Italian branch of Revolut Bank UAB (Lithuania-licensed)
Duration One year
People involved 24, either under investigation or convicted
Alleged offences Money laundering and tax fraud, with possible mafia links
Funds concealed or transferred €41.9 million between 2021 and 2026
Alternative figure (MF-Milano Finanza) €76.5 million when including broader proceedings
Origin of action 2024 Guardia di Finanza inspection into Revolut Digital Assets Europe (formerly RT Digital Securities Cyprus)
Corrective plan 15 points, overseen by court-appointed administrators
Next hearing 25 February 2027
Parallel action Banca d’Italia separately reported to have launched its own inspection of the Italian branch
Revolut response Said it would cooperate fully; banking services continue to operate normally

The event was first reported by Euronews and independently covered by other outlets the same day, including Bloomberg and Yahoo Finance.

What it means

Judicial administration (amministrazione giudiziaria) is a preventive measure under Italian law, more familiar from cases involving fashion suppliers or logistics contractors accused of enabling labour abuses or organised-crime infiltration. Applying it to the Italian branch of a Lithuania-licensed EU bank is unusual and signals that Italian prosecutors see the same framework as applicable to digital finance. This context matters for anyone following the Revolut Italy judicial administration.

A core point in the court’s reasoning, as reported, is that inadequate AML safeguards at the branch enabled 24 individuals to move or conceal €41.9 million over roughly five years. The court did not accuse Revolut of complicity; the measure is preventive and corrective, not punitive, and the bank’s services continue to operate normally. The 15-point corrective plan and the February 2027 hearing suggest the focus is on fixing controls rather than winding the branch down. It is a central thread in the wider Revolut Italy judicial administration.

The case also touches the crypto side of the group: it originated from a 2024 Guardia di Finanza inspection into Revolut Digital Assets Europe, formerly RT Digital Securities Cyprus. That detail matters because it links the AML concerns to digital-asset flows as well as traditional payments. The parallel Banca d’Italia inspection, as reported, suggests domestic supervisors want their own view of the Italian operation, even though primary prudential supervision of Revolut Bank UAB sits in Lithuania under the EU passporting regime. Such details shaped how the Revolut Italy judicial administration unfolded.

For the wider market, this is widely seen as a signal that Italy is prepared to use domestic preventive tools against fintechs that reach Italian customers via EU banking passports, rather than relying solely on home-country supervisors. Whether that pattern spreads to other member states is not something the Milan order itself answers. This is one of the defining aspects of the Revolut Italy judicial administration.

Good to know — The figures above come from public reporting on 16 November 2026. The €41.9 million total is the figure attributed to the Milan court’s findings; MF-Milano Finanza separately cited €76.5 million when including broader proceedings. These are not the same number measuring the same thing, and both should be read with that caveat.

How this fits Italy’s banking landscape

Italy hosts a dense network of traditional retail banks in Italy, from large national groups to cooperative and regional lenders, alongside a growing roster of EU-passported digital banks serving Italian customers from Dublin, Vilnius, Berlin and elsewhere. Revolut’s Italian branch sits in that second category: the licence is Lithuanian, the customers are Italian, and the physical footprint is minimal compared with legacy banks.

That structure is legal and common across the single market, but it does create a supervisory split. Prudential rules are set and primarily enforced where the licence is held; conduct, consumer-protection and AML enforcement often fall to the host country where customers actually live. The Milan order is an example of a host-country authority acting decisively within its own legal toolkit while home-country supervision continues in parallel.

What happens next

Court-appointed administrators will oversee the 15-point corrective plan during the one-year administration period. The next hearing is set for 25 February 2027, at which the court can review progress. Separately, Banca d’Italia’s own inspection of the Italian branch was reported to be under way; its outcome has not been disclosed.

Revolut said it would cooperate fully with Italian authorities and confirmed that banking services would continue to operate normally for customers. Nothing in the public reporting suggests account access, card payments or deposits are affected by the administration order itself.

Explore the full data behind this article: bank branches worldwide and ATMs worldwide in the gf6.com directory.

Methodology

This article is a rewrite for style of already-public reporting. All specific facts — the date, the court, the prosecutor, the investigating body, the entities named, the €41.9 million and €76.5 million figures, the 24 individuals, the one-year duration, the 15-point plan, the 25 February 2027 hearing and Revolut’s response — come from the original report by Euronews, corroborated by Bloomberg and Yahoo Finance. No figures have been added, estimated or recalculated. Contextual framing about EU banking passports and Italian preventive administration is general background, not reporting of new facts. gf6.com maintains a curated worldwide directory of around 445,000 bank and ATM locations, built manually since 2020; the directory is a large but incomplete sample and is not an official register.

Frequently asked questions


What did the Milan court actually order?

It placed the Italian branch of Revolut Bank UAB under judicial administration for one year, with court-appointed administrators overseeing a 15-point corrective plan. The next hearing is scheduled for 25 February 2027.


Is Revolut being accused of money laundering itself?

According to the reporting, the court found that inadequate AML safeguards enabled 24 people under investigation or convicted of offences including money laundering and tax fraud to move or conceal funds. The measure is preventive and corrective; Revolut said it would cooperate fully and that services continue normally.


Why do the reported figures differ — €41.9 million or €76.5 million?

The €41.9 million figure is attributed to the Milan court’s findings on funds concealed or transferred between 2021 and 2026. MF-Milano Finanza, in Italian-language reporting, cited €76.5 million when including broader proceedings. They are different scopes, not a corrected figure.


Does this affect Revolut customers in Italy?

Revolut stated that banking services would continue to operate normally. The administration order concerns governance and controls at the branch, not day-to-day customer operations as reported.


Why can an Italian court act against a Lithuania-licensed bank?

Judicial administration is an Italian preventive measure that can be applied where activity on Italian territory is found to have enabled crimes. Prudential supervision of Revolut Bank UAB remains with Lithuanian authorities under the EU passporting regime; the two tracks can run in parallel.


What is Revolut Digital Assets Europe's role in the case?

The judicial action originated from a 2024 Guardia di Finanza inspection into Revolut Digital Assets Europe, formerly RT Digital Securities Cyprus, which handles crypto services for European users. That inspection led into the broader AML findings reflected in the Milan court’s order.


This article was produced with AI assistance from publicly available sources and is handled under our editorial standards and AI policy.

Karl Schnürch

I have been online since 1995. For many years, I worked in the e-commerce sector, setting up several online shops, and have always been interested in data analysis. In 2007, I moved to the Seychelles to work from there or as a digital nomad. In recent years, I have increasingly specialised in the financial sector. I manage the Seychelles’ Commercial Register and am also very familiar with the offshore world. GF6.com is a project I have been working on for many years. I built and curated the 445,000-entry bank database myself over a period of six years, and for the past two years or so I have also been using AI to achieve better structures.

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